Cleavages and Right-wing Populist Discourse in Brazil: The Bolsonaro Era in Focus
by Gülşen Doğan
Reviewed by Matheus Lucas Hebling
Populism manifests differently in various geographies due to different national frameworks, including political history, system, and culture. However, a common thread among populist movements is their claim of embodying the people as the voice of the people and the outsider opposing the morally compromised ruling elite, be it at a local or global level (Barr, 2009; Moffitt, 2016; Mudde, 2013; Müller, 2015). Accordingly, the primary focus of this blog article is on how the discourse of right-wing populism is addressed in Brazil. Bolsonaro, a right-wing populist, frequently employed polarizing language to appeal to followers, but his messaging also included different degrees of identity-centered themes. Pronounced political divisions and unique populist rhetoric characterized his period of governance. These divisions were predominantly influenced by economic, social, and cultural dimensions, which Bolsonaro skillfully exploited to fortify his constituency. His populist rhetoric was especially marked by a pronounced antiestablishment attitude, a strong sense of nationalism, and an emphasis on law and order, which appealed to a heterogeneous voter demographic.
Zucco and Power (2021) categorized right-wing politics in Brazil into four distinct groups: Firstly, the “authoritarian nostalgia” faction upholds the military dictatorship’s legacy, opposes human rights initiatives, and aligns with the security sector and gun advocacy. This segment, previously peripheral, experienced a surge in influence following Bolsonaro’s rise. Secondly, the religious right, associated with neo-Pentecostal churches, advocates for the “defense of family” and pursues a conservative “culture war” agenda. Throughout the 2018 electoral campaign, well-coordinated networks of Pentecostal priests served as a crucial means of communication for Bolsonaro, effectively capturing the attention of Brazil’s evangelical population (Franzen, 2022). The Bolsonaro government had a longstanding association with the Evangelical church, which can be traced back to the military’s utilization of the Catholic Church to smoothen the transition from military governance to democracy in the 1980s (Tatarczyk, 2018; Mohan and Padmanabhan, 2022).
Thirdly, the economic right, with limited impact, supports free-market and “neoliberal” policies while displaying less enthusiasm for other conservative causes. Lastly, the clientelistic and opportunistic right, known as “the Centrão,” lacks ideological solid convictions and primarily prioritizes employment, corruption, and favors. This group thrives within “rent-seeking parties” and tends to align with the federal government whenever advantageous, as seen during Lula’s administration. Highly pragmatic, they have contributed to the fragmentation of political parties on the right despite their numerical superiority. Following the 2013 protests, these factions rallied behind Bolsonaro in opposition to the PT. The Centrão played a pivotal role in the impeachment of Dilma Rousseff and the subsequent ascension of Michel Temer during 2013-2016.
In light of the increasing influence of right-wing populism, societal divisions have given rise to emotional polarization, leading to the formation of pro-PT (Workers’ Party, PT) and anti-PT factions, which eventually evolved into pro-Bolsonaro and anti-Bolsonaro sentiments, commonly known as antibolsonarismo after Bolsonaro’s term. Bolsonaro’s populist rhetoric was strikingly anti-establishment, explicitly targeting the political elite and media conglomerates. He framed himself as a non-establishment figure capable of contesting the prevailing order, employing slogans such as “Brazil above everything. God above everyone,” which resonated with nationalist sentiments observed in various nations (Silva, 2020). Shortly before Bolsonaro’s electoral victory, Brazil found itself grappling with four concurrent crises: a financial crisis resulting from a prolonged period of economic downturn, a political crisis marked by escalating polarization and a diminishing trust in established political factions, a corruption crisis spotlighted by the Lava Jato probe, and a further deterioration of an already precarious public security landscape.
Bolsonaro exploited this situation by campaigning for “law and order” in Brazil while advocating a robust anti-corruption stance that deeply resonated with the public (Pearson and Paulo Trevisani, 2018). His highlighting of his military background during Brazil’s past military rule (1964-85) enhanced his image as a strong leader committed to combating crime. As a result, his discourse mainly exploited the antiestablishment divide, rooted in a widespread feeling of pervasive disillusionment with the political sphere and its actors and the antipetista divide, revolving around the desire among numerous voters to administer belated retribution to the PT.
His communicative approach was straightforward and frequently provocative, contributing to his sustained visibility and effective engagement with his constituents. This methodology indicated a more significant phenomenon wherein right-wing populists leverage digital media to circumvent traditional media outlets. Bolsonaro’s rhetoric highlighted ethical and cultural concerns, frequently juxtaposing them with the left-leaning PT. He invoked concepts of nationalism, xenophobia, and a robust state apparatus, appealing to conservative ideologies and a yearning to revive traditional societal norms (Dalmonte & Dibai, 2019). His discourse incorporated facets of right-wing extremism, including anti-communist sentiments and an affirmative perspective on Brazil’s military dictatorship. This narrative resonated with specific demographics within the populace who were disenchanted with democratic frameworks and yearned to restore perceived historical grandeur (Mattos, 2022). Bolsonaro’s ascendance was notably facilitated by his calculated media utilization, mainly social media platforms like Twitter. Similarly, Davis and Straubhaar’s (2020) content analysis on the social media campaign of Bolsonaro clearly shows that antipetismo discourse mobilized the general unrest against the PT before the 2018 elections and paved the way for Bolsonaro’s presidency.
Da Silva’s (2019) discourse analysis on public events, social media, news broadcasts, and private speeches of Bolsonaro also shows how Bolsonaro openly used an antiblack discourse and denied racism and race-targeted policies during his campaign and presidency. Historically, Brazil has been identified as one of the nations that experienced colonization, resulting in a society characterized by race-based diversities. Racial, socioeconomic, and regional disparities exist in Brazil but are not inherently incompatible. For example, Brazil’s socioeconomic inequality is divided into the North and South regions. However, Brazil has not experienced militant separatism, where the separatists claim an ethnicity-based separation and a state formation. Instead, social division is prominent concerning the infrastructural capabilities of different states, income disparities among the populace, and educational unevenness within society. In other words, despite the regional and racial heterogeneity within the country, subnational origin and skin color have not been intensely politicized. This historical development, however, has contributed to the emergence of socioeconomic inequalities and the influential role of elites in Brazilian politics (Lustig et al., 2013; Schneider, 2015) and notably, between 2003 and 2010, the period marked a significant shift in Brazilian economic growth under President Lula’s inclusionary populist policies, leading to increased wages, poverty alleviation, and improved living conditions. This transformative phase was instrumental in fostering economic expansion characterized by low inflation rates, higher minimum wages, enhanced standards of living for those in lower socioeconomic strata, and decreased poverty levels (Yarar, 2019).
During the PT government, challenges, however, emerged predominantly about the escalating economic downturn, surge in urban violence, and inquiries into governmental corruption (Operation Car Wash/Operação Lava Jato) (Akkoyunlu et al., 2021, p. 9). Ultimately, this led to the impeachment of President Rousseff, marking the beginning of Michel Temer’s interim presidency, who advocated for neoliberal strategies but faced disapproval from the electorate due to his entanglement in corruption probes and the disqualification measures targeting Lula. Bolsonaro adeptly exploited the prevailing economic vulnerabilities and public discontent regarding austerity policies, echoing the strategies of his predecessor, Lula, albeit emphasizing themes of insecurity and corruption (Iacoella et al., 2020). Bolsonaro’s constituency predominantly comprised the middle class, who perceived themselves at risk due to economic volatility and alleged corruption. His discourse emphasizing law and order resonated with this demographic, which had grown disenchanted with conventional political elites and yearned for a robust leader to reestablish stability.
While Bolsonaro’s populist approaches effectively inspired support, they exacerbated pre-existing societal divisions and polarized the political milieu. His emphasis on nationalism, antiestablishment discourse, and cultural conservatism resonated with numerous Brazilians yet encountered considerable opposition. Consequently, the Bolsonaro administration underscored the intricate interplay between economic, social, and cultural dimensions in forming right-wing populist movements within contemporary democratic contexts.
References
Akkoyunlu, Karabekir. 2021. “Efficiency, Merit, and Privilege: Public Administration Reforms in Brazil and Turkey.” Revista do Serviço Público 72 no.1: 200–231.
Barr, R. R. 2009. “Populists, Outsiders, and Anti-Establishment Politics”. Party Politics, 15 no. 1: 29–48.
da Silva, A.J.B. and Larkins, E.R. 2019. “The Bolsonaro Election, Antiblackness, and Changing Race Relations in Brazil”. The Journal of Latin American and Caribbean Anthropology.
Dalmonte, Edson and Priscilla Dibai. 2019. “A direita radical ‘bolsonarista’: da aporofobia à defesa da memória de regimes de exceção”, IdeAs [En ligne], 14. https://doi.org/10.4000/ideas.6895
Davis, S., & Straubhaar, J. 2020. “Producing Antipetismo: Media activism and the rise of the radical, nationalist right in contemporary Brazil”. International Communication Gazette, 82 no.1: 82-100
Franzen, Niklas. 2022. “How Bolsonaro is breaking the divide between the State and church”. IPS. https://www.ips-journal.eu/topics/democracy-and-society/how-bolsonaro-is-breaking-the-divide-between-state-and-church-6168/
Iacoella, F., Justino, P. , Martorano, B. 2020. “Roots of dissent: Trade liberalization and the rise of populism in Brazil”. WIDER Working Paper 2020/118. Helsinki: UNU-WIDER. https://doi.org/10.35188/UNU-WIDER/2020/875-7
Lustig, Nora and Pessino, Carola and Scott, John. 2013. “The Impact of Taxes and Social Spending on Inequality and Poverty in Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Mexico, Peru, and Uruguay: An Overview”. Public Finance Review, 42.
Mattos, Marcelo Badaró. 2022. “Governo Bolsonaro Neofascismo e autocracia burguesa no Brasil”. Relações Internacionais Março 73: 25-39
Mohan, D., & Padmanabhan, A. 2022. Strongmen Saviours: A Political Economy of Populism in India, Turkey, Russia and Brazil (1st ed.). Routledge. https://doi.org/10.4324/9781003298694
Mudde, C. 2013. “Three Decades of Populist Radical Right Parties in Western Europe: So What?” European Journal of Political Research 52 no. 1.
Müller, Jan Zielonka. 2015. “Parsing Populism: Who Is and Who Is Not a Populist These Days?” Juncture 22, no. 2: 80–89.
Schneider, B. (2015). “The developmental state in Brazil: Comparative and historical perspectives”. Revista de Economia Politica, 35.
Silva, F. de S., Queiroz, R. C. de S., Branco, M. dos R. F. C., Habenschus, M. I. A. T., Scorzafave, L. G., Saraiva, M. da C. P., Bettiol, H., Barbieri, M. A., Rodrigues, M. A. F. R., Barbosa, Y. C., Simões, V. M. F., and Silva, A. A. M. da. 2019. “Foco e Cobertura do Programa Bolsa Família em Crianças das Coortes de Nascimento BRISA, Ribeirão Preto (São Paulo) e São Luís (Maranhão), Brasil.” Cadernos de Saúde Pública 35, no. 6.
Tatarczyk, Dawid, 2018. “The Catholic Church and Its Impact on Public Policy in Contemporary Democracies” Dissertations 3303.
https://scholarworks.wmich.edu/dissertations/3303
Yarar, Eralp. 2019. “The Effects of Political Regime Type on Income Inequality: A Comparative Analysis of China And Brazil”. Koç University Thesis. https://acikbilim.yok.gov.tr/bitstream/handle/20.500.12812/167203/yokAcikBilim_10283886.pdf?isAllowed=y&sequence=-1
Zucco, Cesar, Jr. and Timothy J. Power. 2021. “Fragmentation Without Cleavages? Endogenous Fractionalization in the Brazilian Party System”. Comparative Politics, 53 no.3: 477-500.
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Gülşen Doğan is a Ph.D. candidate in Political Science and International Relations at Koc University. She graduated summa cum laude from Bogazici University with a B.A. in Political Science and International Relations & Sociology. She received her M.A. degree from International Relations at Koc University with a thesis on the institutional and ideological conditions for the extent of executive aggrandizement in Turkey and Brazil in the last decade. Her research interests lie in the intersection of populism, democratic backsliding, political economy, governance, political parties, migration diplomacy, and disaster diplomacy. In terms of area studies, she studies on Turkey, Brazil and the EU. During her undergraduate studies, she chaired the Center for European Studies Student Forum (CESSF). It is a forum that organizes academic meetings and publishes analyses and policy recommendations on the processes of EU politics and EU-Turkey relations. In 2022, she also worked as a non-resident research assistant in Turkey program at the Middle East Institute (MEI). Between 2020 and 2023, she worked as a researcher and editor in Democratization and Development Programs at an Istanbul-based think tank, Istanbul Political Research Institute (IstanPol). Currently, she works at MiReKoç (Migration Research Center at Koç University) as a project researcher for the Horizon Europe Twinning project: BROAD-ER (Bridging the Migration and Urban Studies Nexus).
Gülşen Doğan (2024) "Cleavages and Right-wing Populist Discourse in Brazil: The Bolsonaro Era in Focus". Brazilian Research and Studies Blog. ISSN 2701-4924. ISSN 2701-4924nameVol. 3 Num. 1. available at: https://bras-center.com/cleavages-and-right-wing-populist-discourse-in-brazil-the-bolsonaro-era-in-focus/, accessed on: November 21, 2024.
Elon Musk: A New Antagonist in Brazilian Politics?
by Maria José Zehn
Elon Musk, the enigmatic billionaire known for his ventures like SpaceX and Tesla, has recently become a prominent figure in Brazilian politics, albeit for controversial reasons. His confrontational stance and direct criticisms of X (former Twitter) aimed at the government and the judiciary have sparked heated debates and raised concerns among the Brazilian population. However, Musk’s involvement in Brazilian affairs extends beyond mere criticism; it represents a significant challenge to the nation’s democratic institutions and political stability.
In recent months, Musk’s public clashes with Supreme Court Justice Alexandre de Moraes have dominated headlines, as he openly questioned judicial decisions and accused the Brazilian judiciary of censorship. These confrontations have escalated tensions and fueled a broader debate about the judiciary’s role in regulating free speech and media in the country.
Moreover, this episode comes at a moment in Brazilian politics, as Congress debates regulations to curb the spread of misinformation and fake news on social media platforms. Concerns over the impact of disinformation on electoral processes and the broader democratic fabric of the country fuel these discussions.
The proliferation of fake news has emerged as a significant challenge in Brazilian politics, with misinformation campaigns often used to manipulate public opinion and undermine trust in democratic institutions. Musk’s vocal criticisms of the government and judiciary have added a new dimension to this debate, raising questions about the influence of influential individuals in shaping public discourse and political outcomes.
Furthermore, his involvement in this episode underscores the growing influence of tech billionaires in shaping global affairs. With vast economic resources and unparalleled access to digital platforms, individuals like Musk wield significant power and influence over public opinion and political processes. However, this influence is only sometimes wielded responsibly, as evidenced by Musk’s confrontational approach and disregard for established norms of political discourse.
Elon Musk’s emergence in Brazilian politics mirrors a broader trend of influential figures utilizing media platforms to shape political discourse and influence electoral outcomes. This phenomenon is not unique to Brazil but is evident across the globe, with notable examples including former U.S. President Donald Trump and other powerful politicians leveraging media in their electoral campaigns.
Donald Trump’s presidency was characterized by his unprecedented use of social media, particularly Twitter, to communicate directly with his supporters and bypass traditional media channels. Trump’s provocative tweets and controversial statements often dominated news cycles, shaping public opinion and influencing political debates. His mastery of social media allowed him to cultivate a loyal base of supporters and amplify his message, contributing to his successful presidential campaign 2016.
The events of January 6th, 2021, in the United States, when a violent mob stormed the Capitol building in Washington, D.C., shocked the world and underscored the potential dangers of political polarization and misinformation. The insurrection, fueled by false claims of election fraud and perpetuated by inflammatory rhetoric from then-President Donald Trump and his supporters, resulted in chaos, destruction, and loss of life. The attempted coup highlighted the fragility of democratic institutions and the alarming consequences of unchecked disinformation and political extremism.
Comparatively, the events of January 8th, 2024, in Brazil bear similarities to the turmoil witnessed in the United States. Today, Brazilian authorities foiled a plot targeting the Supreme Federal Court (STF) and other government institutions, known as the “8 de Janeiro” plot. The investigation revealed plans for violent attacks and destabilization efforts orchestrated by far-right extremists, echoing the tactics employed in the U.S. Capitol riot. While the scale and outcomes of the two events differed, they both underscored the challenges posed by radicalization, misinformation, and political violence in modern democracies. Both coup attempts were orchestrated and disseminated live on social networks.
The necessity of regulating social media and other channels, such as large working platforms, has become increasingly apparent in recent years due to their significant influence on public discourse, societal dynamics, and economic activities. These platforms have amassed unprecedented power and reach, enabling them to shape political opinions, disseminate information, and facilitate economic transactions on a global scale. However, their unchecked influence has also given rise to challenges that necessitate regulatory intervention.
One of the primary reasons for regulating social media and other digital platforms is to address issues related to misinformation and disinformation. The rapid spread of fake news, conspiracy theories, and harmful content on these platforms has contributed to societal polarization, undermined trust in institutions, and posed risks to public health and safety. Regulatory measures are needed to hold platforms accountable for the content they host and to ensure that they take proactive steps to mitigate the spread of misinformation.
Additionally, the dominance of a few tech giants in the digital space has raised concerns about competition and market concentration. Companies like Facebook, Google, and X (the former Twitter) wield significant influence over online discourse and commerce, stifling competition and innovation. Regulatory interventions, such as antitrust enforcement and data privacy regulations, are necessary to promote fair competition, protect consumer rights, and prevent monopolistic behavior.
Furthermore, the rise of platform-based gig economy models has highlighted the need for regulations to protect the rights and well-being of workers. Many gig economy workers, such as Uber drivers and food delivery couriers, need more job security, benefits, and fair wages due to the precarious nature of their employment arrangements. Regulating these platforms is essential to ensure that workers are treated fairly, receive adequate protections, and have avenues for recourse in cases of exploitation or abuse.
Moreover, regulatory intervention is necessary to address broader societal concerns related to digital platforms, such as privacy violations, algorithmic bias, and online harassment. These platforms collect vast user data without adequate consent or transparency, leading to privacy breaches and surveillance concerns. Additionally, algorithmic systems used by these platforms often perpetuate biases and discrimination, exacerbating social inequalities and reinforcing existing power dynamics. Regulation is needed to hold platforms accountable for these issues and to ensure that they operate in a manner that respects users’ rights and promotes equity and inclusion.
Regulating social media and other digital platforms is essential to address various pressing challenges related to misinformation, market concentration, worker rights, and societal well-being. Whether intentionally or inadvertently, influential figures like Musk possess significant power and influence that can disrupt democratic processes and societal tensions. Effective regulation can foster a digital ecosystem that is fair, transparent, and conducive to the public interest while also preserving the benefits of digital innovation and connectivity.
Electoral Accessibility in Brazil: The Role of the Electoral Judiciary
by Márcia Inês Schaefer*
Reviewed and edited by Matheus Lucas Hebling
Since 2012, the third Thursday of May has been celebrated as Global Accessibility Awareness Day (GAAD) to get everyone talking, thinking, and learning about digital access and inclusion for people with disabilities.
To participate in the GAAD initiative, as a political scientist, I have chosen to address the topic of electoral accessibility, giving attention to the actions on digital accessibility promoted by the Brazilian Electoral Judiciary. As Silva and de la Rue (2015, p. 320) pointed out, “Citizen participation in the public sphere can only be guaranteed if e-government policies are concerned with creating space for anyone and everyone to access government websites, consult information, and participate in the construction of the political process.”
According to the Brazilian legal framework, which is aligned with the United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD), the definitions of barriers and accessibility are as follows.
The Brazilian Inclusion Law (Law nº 13.146/2015) defines barriers as any obstacles, attitudes, or behaviors that prevent or limit the social and political participation of persons with disabilities, as well as the possibility of enjoying their rights to accessibility, freedom of movement and expression, communication, access to information, understanding, safe circulation, among others.
Six types of barriers are usually identified: urban planning, architectonic, transport, communications, and information, technological, and attitudinal.
In Art. 3, the Brazilian Inclusion Law defines accessibility as the “possibility and condition of reach for use, with safety and autonomy, of spaces, furniture, urban equipment, buildings, transport, information, and communication, including their systems and technologies, as well as other services and facilities open to the public, for public use or private for collective use, both in urban and rural areas, by people with disabilities or reduced mobility.”
As primarily known, political institutions, such as the political parties and the Electoral Judiciary, play an essential role by providing the conditions that people with disabilities can participate in the electoral process by voting and being candidates (Mello et al., 2021). How do our political institutions translate the definition of accessibility into actions in daily activities in a way that builds a more inclusive society for all people?
The answer to this question is not easy because, in Brazil, we have a lack of studies about the electoral participation of persons with disabilities. This is due to historical reasons, such as exclusion and invisibilization processes suffered by these groups, and the recent availability of electoral data on this portion of the population (Mello et al., 2021; Lüchmann, Schaefer, and Mello, 2022; Piccolo, 2023).
We do not yet have a systematic study of how the Brazilian political parties proceed to include persons with disabilities in their party cadres and what level of attention is paid to the issue of accessibility in their daily activities. Mello et al. (2021) mentioned that some political parties have a committee or other internal structure focused on disability issues. Piccolo (2023) noticed that only a few parties provide accessibility resources on their official websites and pages on social media.
On the other side, some studies emphasize the relevance of the Electoral Accessibility Program of the Brazilian Electoral Judiciary (Dias and Junqueira, 2017; Neto, 2020; Mello, 2021). Following the recommendation of the National Council of Justice (CNJ), this program was created in 2012 (Res. TSE nº 23.381/2012) to gradually implement measures to remove physical, architectural, communication, and attitudinal barriers, to promote broad and unrestricted access, with safety and autonomy for people with disabilities or reduced mobility in the electoral process.
The Electoral Accessibility Program has nine main goals:
Provide full accessibility at polling stations;
Adequacy of electronic voting machines with Braille system, audio system, and Libras;
Training of poll workers to assist and facilitate voting by voters with disabilities or reduced mobility;
Make necessary adaptations to websites and procedural monitoring systems to guarantee full access to information available to people with visual impairments;
Through the media sector of the Electoral Courts:
I – in non-election years: carry out awareness campaigns for voters with disabilities or reduced mobility regarding the importance of voting, requesting an update on their situation before the Electoral Court so that it can provide what is necessary to facilitate voting;
II – in an election year: carry out information campaigns for voters with disabilities or reduced mobility regarding the importance of voting, informing: the possibility of, up to 151 days before the election, transfer to polling stations capable of meeting their needs; the possibility of informing the electoral judge of their restrictions and needs, so that the Electoral Court can provide the means to facilitate their voting; and that voters with special needs will be able to count on the assistance of a person they trust during voting;
Permanent updating of the status of voters with disabilities or reduced mobility in the National Voter Register;
Through the Personnel Management Secretariats of the Electoral Courts, implementation of actions aimed at raising awareness about the importance of accessibility and social integration of people with disabilities, training employees on accessibility standards, and eliminating barriers;
Incorporate accessibility actions and goals into the strategic planning of Electoral Courts;
Establishment of a multidisciplinary committee designed to prepare an action plan covering the measures provided for in this Resolution, monitor the activities carried out, and forward the respective report to the Superior Electoral Court by December 20th of each year.
The materialization of the program is through action plans prepared by the permanent accessibility and inclusion committees of all regional electoral courts in the country. These committees are composed of employees from the electoral courts. However, in specific issues, there are often technical cooperations with non-governmental organizations of persons with disabilities, universities, and other government institutions.
There are at least five main actions: management of accessibility and inclusion in the electoral court, accessibility of services, communicational accessibility, technological accessibility, and urban and architectural accessibility.
According to the annual accessibility reports of the Electoral Judiciary, the electoral courts may be progressively promoting digital accessibility following the E-Government Manual (eMAG) and the Web Content Accessibility Guidelines (WCAG).
Some of the digital accessibility services offered are the availability of alternative text in the images used, description of the form contents, shortcut keys, content skipping keys, accessible language, background contrast, and others. Users with difficulty accessing the website’s contents can use the Rybená functionality. Rybená offers the deaf, hearing impaired, partially visual, elderly, illiterate, dyslexic, and others with special needs the possibility of understanding the texts on web pages unsupervised. The software translates texts from Portuguese into Brazilian Sign Language (LIBRAS) and converts written Portuguese to voice.
Some challenges regarding the promotion of accessible digital environments are, for example, the fact that the construction of an inclusive institutional culture requires a lot of study and interest from actors in its implementation; adapting to accessibility can be a time-consuming process, often due to budget limits for purchasing software or paying companies that offer accessibility services, such as LIBRAS interpreters and shorthand.
It is essential to highlight the relevance of dialogue between the electoral judiciary and civil society organizations formed by people with disabilities, as these can contribute significantly to ensuring that accessibility is consistent with the actual demands of these people, as, despite general standards, there are many specificities to guarantee accessibility for different people with disabilities.
Finally, in a country marked by social inequalities that are also reflected in digital inequality (Hansen, 2021), it is essential to consider that many people, with or without disabilities, do not even have digital access. When they do, they are often not instructed on how to use it. In this sense, the debate on digital accessibility is also permeated by the debate on social inequality.
References
Brasil. Lei Nº 13.146/2015. Institui a Lei Brasileira de Inclusão da Pessoa com Deficiência (Estatuto da Pessoa com Deficiência). Disponível em: https://www.planalto.gov.br/ccivil_03/_ato2015-2018/2015/lei/l13146.htm
Conselho Nacional de Justiça. Resolução CNJ N. 401/2021. Dispõe sobre o desenvolvimento de diretrizes de acessibilidade e inclusão de pessoas com deficiência nos órgãos do Poder Judiciário e de seus serviços auxiliares, e regulamenta o funcionamento de unidades de acessibilidade e inclusão. Disponível em: https://atos.cnj.jus.br/atos/detalhar/3987
Dias J, Junqueira ALC. O Direito à Participação Política das Pessoas com Deficiência. Resenha Eleitoral [Internet]. 1º de julho de 2017 [citado 7º de abril de 2024]; 21(2): 159-80. Disponível em: https://revistaresenha.emnuvens.com.br/revista/article/view/96
Global Accessibility Awareness Day (GAAD) Foundation: https://accessibility.day/. It was accessed on April 14th, 2024.
Hansen, Jaqueline Resmini. Desigualdades digitais, políticas e sociais no Brasil: um diálogo entre as abordagens do comportamento político e dos estudos de internet. Tese de Doutorado em Ciência Política, UFMG, 2021. Available from: https://repositorio.ufmg.br/handle/1843/49316
Lüchmann, L. H. H.; Schaefer, M. I.; Mello, A. G. A participação política das pessoas com deficiência no Brasil. In: Karina Lilia Pasquariello Mariano, Lígia Helena Hahn Lüchmann e Rafael da Silva. (Org.). Estudos sobre a participação política no Brasil. 1ed. São Paulo: Cultura Acadêmica, 2022, v. 16, p. 163-196. Available from: https://npms.paginas.ufsc.br/files/2023/04/livro-procad-2-1.pdf
Mello, Anahí Guedes de et al. A participação eleitoral das pessoas com deficiência no Brasil: desafios e perspectivas. Estudos Eleitorais, Brasília, DF, v. 15, n. 2, p. 267-282, jul./dez. 2021. Available from: https://bibliotecadigital.tse.jus.br/xmlui/handle/bdtse/10842
Melo, Liana Holanda de. Direito ao voto da pessoa com deficiência a partir do estudo do Programa de Acessibilidade da Justiça Eleitoral do Ceará. Dissertação de Mestrado em Ciência Política. Lisboa/Portugal: Universidade de Lisboa, 2021. Available from: https://search.proquest.com/openview/977d2ffbfb5ab3bd2005fa341fac7376/1?pq-origsite=gscholar&cbl=2026366&diss=y
Neto, Demétrio Saker. A participação da pessoa com deficiência no sistema eleitoral do estado do Ceará. R. Themis, Fortaleza, v. 18, n. 1, p.71-97, jan./jun. 2020. Available from: https://doi.org/10.56256/themis.v18i1.751
Piccolo GM, Mendes EG. Direito inacessível: pessoas com deficiência e eleições no Brasil. Lua Nova [Internet]. 2023 Sep; (120): 287–323. Available from: https://doi.org/10.1590/0102-287323/120
Tribunal Superior Eleitoral. Instrução Normativa Nº 10, de 10 de agosto de 2022. Regulamenta a gestão de conteúdos dos Portais da Justiça Eleitoral. Disponível em: https://www.tse.jus.br/legislacao/compilada/in/2022/instrucao-normativa-no-10-de-10-de-agosto-de-2022
Tribunal Superior Eleitoral. Resolução TSE nº 23.381/2012. Institui o Programa de Acessibilidade da Justiça Eleitoral e dá outras providências. https://www.tse.jus.br/legislacao/compilada/res/2012/resolucao-no-23-381-de-19-de-junho-de-2012
* Márcia Inês Schaefer is a PhD student in Sociology and Political Science at the Federal University of Santa Catarina. Member of the Research Group about Social Movements (NPMS/UFSC) and BraS Center. Her research interest is mainly electoral and non-electoral participation, focused on the political inclusion of persons with disabilities in Brazil.
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